Built-in Stabilizers and Risk Literacy: Protecting the Sustainability of the Insurance Industry by Goto, Shigeyuki
c e n t e r  o n  j a p a n e s e  e c o n o m y  a n d  b u s i n e s s
Occasional Paper Series May 2012, No. 60
Built-in Stabilizers and Risk Literacy: 
Protecting the Sustainability of the Insurance 
Industry
Shigeyuki Goto
This paper is available online at www.gsb.columbia.edu/cjeb/research
C O L U M B I A   U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  T H E  C I T Y  O F  N E W  Y O R K
  1/17 
Built-in Stabilizers and Risk Literacy: Protecting the Sustainability of the Insurance Industry 
 
April 26 2012 
Shigeyuki GOTO 




Just as any chain is only as strong as its weakest link, any sophisticated, cutting edge 
assessment is only as good as the robustness of the underlying assumptions. This is increasingly true 
for tail-risks, where even the most advanced predictions and modelled outputs are not immune from 
judgement errors and/or statistical uncertainty. On the part of insurers, this warrants better pooling of 
risks by way of creation a better diversified portfolio and the building up of capital buffers for 
unforeseen/unpredicted events. 
 
In this paper, I wish to touch on two approaches to achieve the above; the first is to have 
built-in stabilizers in place in the form of special systems and/or schemes; the second is to raise 
awareness of and have in place processes that address psychological biases behind the various 
assumptions and analysis we use in our day to day operations. 
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1. Built-in stabilizers 
 
Japan’s experience  
 
The yield for 10-year Japanese government bonds that once exceeded 8% in the 1990s are 
currently below 1%. (See Graph 1) This is mainly due to the continuation of Bank of Japan’s very 
low interest rate monetary policy that was originally adopted in 1999. Additionally, the NIKKEI 
average peaked at 39,000 Yen in December 1989. It has since then dropped below 10,000 Yen after 
the bust of the bubble economy, and it hit rock bottom in 2008 at 7,000 Yen. It is currently at around 
8,500 Yen. Interestingly, the Yen continued to appreciate against the U.S. Dollar (almost in a 
synchronized manner) during the same period. (See Graph 2) 
Japanese insurers have had to continuously deal with difficult external factors and market 
conditions such as these, which by any measurement, could be deemed as statistically unlikely 
(‘unforeseeable events’). 
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Insurers going bust due to such ‘unforeseeable events’ 
 
A total of seven small- and middle-sized life insurers went bust in Japan during 1997 to 
2001. The main cause was that they sold savings-type products with guaranteed returns set at 1980 
interest rate levels. (Life insurers ended up building up a portfolio that was overly prone to interest 
rate fluctuations.)  
On the general insurance side, Daiichi Fire declared insolvency in 2000. They too were 
hindered by the excessive sales of long-term fire insurance products that had savings elements. 
Another general insurer, Taisei, failed in 2001 but his was mainly due to their involvement in 
Fortress Re. 
The most recent insolvency case is Yamato Life in 2008 and this was triggered by the 
Lehman crisis. 
(See Graph 3) 
These insurers failed to recognize, manage, and mitigate the inherent danger of their 
distorted and risky portfolio (which was interest rate risk ridden). This made their capital base 
vulnerable, and the absence of proper ALM ultimately led to the failure of these firms. The burst of 
the bubble economy, downturns in the financial market, and catastrophe losses may have all played a 
part in triggering the chain of events, but they were not the core cause in and of themselves. These 
cases were caused by failure of risk management (including ALM). 
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Ways to overcome such extreme events 
 
Given such turbulent and harsh conditions, how did the Japanese general insurance 
industry remain sustainable and robust over the course of so many decades? The Japanese general 
insurance industry has in place special-purpose systems and schemes in place to protect the financial 
stability of the industry. This consists of four pillars: 
 
 
1st Pillar:  Orderly underwriting by the private sector 
 
NLIRO (Non-life Insurance Rating Organization) 
The NLIRO was established in July 2002 as result of the merger of its two predecessor organizations. 
It has 38 member companies and its primary role is to calculate and provide burning cost based 
‘reference rates’ and ‘basic rates’ for certain lines of business. This is an industry-wide effort to come 
up with accurate, sustainable and fair premium rates for lines of business with a particularly high 
degree of public interest such as fire, automobile, and personal accident. Its value-added is derived 
from its capacity to assess and monitor burning costs (i.e. pure rates) based on market-wide data and 
statistics. (Premium rates are more accurate and robust than ones calculated based on in-house data 
of any particular individual insurer.) 
 
Prior regulatory approval of products and rates 
Although Japanese insurers are now allowed to ‘file & use’ many products due to deregulation, 
products in certain lines of business (e.g. personal accident insurance; retail automobile insurance) 
are still subject to prior approval by the regulator. Even for ‘file & use’ products, insurers can further 
facilitate their application process by using NLIRO certified ‘reference rates’. 
 
Both systems ensure that the quality, integrity and robustness of the general insurers’ reserves (which 
are based on an equitable premium method). 
 
 
2nd Pillar:  Policyholder protection 
 
Non-life Insurers Policyholders Protection Corporation (NIPPC) 
The NIPPC was established in December 1998 based on the revision of the Insurance Business Law 
that same year. It has 40 member companies and operates on ex-ante funding. Its primary role is to 
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provide capital (i.e. a lump sum) to the insurer taking over the portfolio of a failed insurer. Where 
there is no third party available, the NIPPC itself assumes the portfolio of the failed insurer and runs 
it off. 
 
Retail insurance (i.e. personal lines) are protected in full (or at a level close to it in certain cases). 












3rd Pillar:  Providing peace of mind and security to the public 
 
CALI and CALI Pool 
CALI (compulsory automobile liability insurance) is based on the Automobile Liability Security 
Law and is compulsory for all drivers. CALI is operated via an industry-wide pool (i.e. CALI pool) 
where insurers pool all CALI premiums and re-distribute it amongst members companies. Paid 
claims are proportionally re-distributed as well. 
 
CALI premium rates are calibrated based on a ‘no-loss, no-profit’ principle. Its indemnity limits are 
for instance JPY 30 mil for death; JPY 40 mil for permanent disabilities; and JPY 1.2 mil for injuries. 
For cases involving non-insured vehicles (i.e. drivers that did not take out CALI) or hit & run 
accidents (i.e. the accused vehicle can not be determined), the state compensates the victim under its 
government compensation programme. 
 
Pooling is the best way to run this line of business (which carries high public interest). This ensures 
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4th Pillar:  Being viable to deal with national disasters and emergencies 
 
Residential earthquake insurance (and corresponding reinsurance scheme） 
Residential earthquake insurance is based on the Earthquake Insurance Law and is packaged 
together with residential fire insurance policies. (Policyholders must opt-out if they do not wish to 
take out this cover.) The insured sum for earthquake insurance can be fixed between 30 to 50% of 
the sum insured of the fire policy (but is capped at JPY 50 mil for property and JPY 30 mil for 
household goods). There is no impact to the profit and loss of the private sector (i..e. this is run on a 
No loss No profit basis). 
 
The reinsurance programme for residential earthquake insurance is run on a tripartite scheme 
supported by: the industry; the Japan Earthquake Reinsurance Company (JERC: capitalized and 
owned by the industry); and the state.  
 
This is one solution based on the collective wisdom and experience of Japan, an earthquake ridden 
market. The premise is that the private sector (i.e. the general insurance industry) remains the 
primary risk carrier first and foremost, but the corresponding reinsurance programme also provides 
for the state to carry a proportional burden via a phase-in scheme linked to the overall loss amount. 

















Nuclear energy insurance pool 
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Nuclear energy insurance is based on the Liability for Nuclear Energy Related Losses Law and is 
operated via an insurance pool: Premiums (written by 15 co-insurers) are pooled and then 
re-distributed amongst 23 pool member companies. Reinsurance is then arranged by the Japan 
Nuclear Energy Pool. 
 
Its indemnity limit is JPY 122.1 bil for liability and JPY 190 bil for property. (This is the pool’s total 
limit: Indemnity limit for liability per power plant is set at JPY 120 bil.) Losses due to earthquake 
and tsunamis are excluded. Those are covered by the state. 
 
Providing commercial cover to nuclear power plants, a major energy source in Japan, is one the 
public roles expected of the general insurance industry. Pooling is the best way to allow risk carriers 
to provide cover for certain large and isolated risks that are immune from the law of large numbers It 
is also worth noting that nuclear energy risks need to be pooled and managed globally (as opposed to 
just domestically). This is a manifestation of the insurance market’s response to so-called ‘beyond 
assumption risks’. For cases where national interest is at stake, these types of joint efforts by the 
government and the private sector are warranted. (This also highlights one of the differences 
between insurers and banks.) 
 
Pre-event cat reserves 
In Japan, both financial and regulatory accounting rules allow insurers to put up pre-event cat 
reserves to cover catastrophe losses with a return period of over a year. This is set out in 
Enforcement Regulations under the Insurance Business Law. Essentially, insurers build up the 
reserve by putting up a certain percentage (e.g. 2%) of their net premium income every year. Tax 
laws put a cap on ‘tax exempt’ pre-event cat reserves. 
 
This is a necessary system for Japanese general insurers to sustain their financial strength in a 
natural-catastrophe ridden market. One must remain aware of the timing element in profit 
recognition (especially when ‘yearly premiums’ covers catastrophes with a return period of over a 
year). This reserving system reflects the nature and reality of the underlying business 
 
Individually building up capital buffers during good times so that we can draw down on them during 
severe times absolutely makes sense. Having such a firm specific counter-cyclical buffer in place - or 
at least structuring one’s capital strategy around that concept – is vital in modern-day insurance 
financing. 
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2. Risk literacy 
 
Recent lessons 
In the run-up to the 2007-09 financial crisis, market participants often echoed the refrain 
‘this time it’s different’. But most aspects of the crisis, particularly sub-prime lending and 
over-leveraging, turned out to be well know risks. Even the sudden rise in correlations between 
markets that are usually non (or less) correlated was something that was experienced within the 
previous decade (e.g. the collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998).  
 The underlying causal human factors of financial crises have been widely discussed for 
decades by social scientists, and described for even longer by historians. (Galbraith, 1994; 
Kindleberger, 2002) There is a good understanding of how frames, heuristics, and other 
psychological biases can lead to bad judgement even amongst some of most experienced business 
experts. 
 
These cases reflect how senior management usually looks at results (or outcomes) on a 
‘point in time’ basis. However, what they actually should be looking at is the ‘process’ from which 
such outcomes are produced from. Too often, managers ignore the possibility of biases (whether on 
the part of individual employees or the organization as a whole) exacerbating a firm’s risk exposure 
in an undetectable manner. Furthermore, over-confidence or optimism at successful companies, and 
myopia or inertia under changing circumstances, often clouds a manager’s eyes, leading him/her to 
overlook the true nature of the risks and levels of uncertainty.  
 
The financial crisis has understandably sparked significant regulatory action. The G20, 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and Joint Forum have been active in reviewing the regulatory 
framework for banks, and such analysis has invariably flowed across to insurance. 
 
As markets evolve and their uniformity gradually increases, regulatory regimes look set 
for greater convergence, over time. In addition to global capital requirements, many regulatory 
frameworks are beginning to include an enhanced ERM framework that considers the organizational 
structure of risk management, governance, reporting, disclosure and transparency requirements, as 
well as consideration for group risks. Increasingly risk-based capital regimes are also employing 
scenario and stress testing requirements.  
 
 However we should pay equal if not more attention to why financial institutions rushed to 
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engage in risky transactions that would eventually wipe out their capital and result in the 
near-collapse of the global financial system. When we observe the details of the previous financial 
crisis, it becomes clear that the players involved in sub-prime loan related transactions more or less 
genuinely believed that they would be missing out on a sure thing if they did not put their money in 
those markets. I have no intention to deny or undermine the value of the financial engineering 
technology that lies behind the advanced securitization and diversification of risk. But we should 
nevertheless be mindful of the fact that all the big and sophisticated firms were on the brink of 
collapse (if not already insolvent) as it turned out they had a very poor view of their risk against 
capital position. In fact, the promises of the new market turned out to be nothing more than an 
illusion and to this day it reminds us that people and firms fall in the same trap over and over again. 
 
 In the hope that the next time will really be different, processes to enforce rational decision 
making against a back drop of unforeseeable risk and uncertainty is attracting more and more 
attention. 
 ‘Risk literacy’ is usually defined as knowledge of probability and statistics. But to be truly 
useful in practice, the concept also needs to address the psychological biases that lead to judgmental 
risk.  
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   According to the study of Kahneman, D. and Finkelstein, S., Whitehead, J. and Campbell, A. 
 
 
In short, our actual decision making has a tendency to start with heuristics based on past experiences 
(System 1) and in cases where we feel it had failed, we then move on to analytical consideration 










Possibly Improper risk 










The belief that real estate prices would continue to rise. 
 
Under-estimation of systemic risk 
The possibility that historic correlations could change was largely ignored. So were the 
consequences of too much leverage. Historical experience was largely overlooked. 
 
Pattern seeking, Simplification 
Risk evaluation models assumed risks were well-diversified and that historic default 
data was applicable. 
 
Over-confidence and information cascade 
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        ( Generated by considering Kahneman, D. Nobel Prize Lecture “ Maps of Bounded Rationality: Perspective 
on Intuitive Judgment and Choice” Dec.8 2002 and Finkelstein, S., Whitehead, J. and Campbell, A., 
2008,Think Again, Harvard Business Press) 
 
 
 Both System 1 and 2 involves judgemental risk. As mentioned already in Table 1, several 
common psychological biases are inherent in our intuition (System1). As mentioned earlier, 
over-confidence or optimism at seemingly successful companies, and myopia or inertia under 
changing circumstances, often clouds a manager’s eyes, leading him/her to overlook the true nature 
of the risks and levels of uncertainty.  
 There is also a judgemental risk trap in System 2 as well. In setting out strategies, we make 
use of the effective theory like Competitive Position model (Porter, 1980,1985) and Resource Based 
View theory (Barney, 1991; Mata, Fuerst, & Barney, 1995; Barney&Clark,2007; Peteraf, 1993; 
Wernerfert, 1984). However this theory in general is based on assumptions which reflect a simplified 
version of the real world. Therefore, when setting out a strategy, we need to monitor whether the 
competitive environment has changed or not and whether the strategy would still apply in practice. 
When we recognize the substantial gap between the initial assumption and reality, we tend to 





Set treatment plan 
from past experiences 
 
System1: Intuition 
Decision making based on Heuristics 
 
Multilateral 








System 2: Reasoning 
Analytical consideration 
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theory, when in fact, faced with symptoms of mis-matches, we should actually consider the revision 
and/or reinforcement of the strategy itself. This is why it is dangerous to rely on or apply techniques 
or strategies that have worked in the past; what may have worked in a previous case does not 
necessarily work in another. We should closely examine the assumptions underlying the ideas, 
opinions, and models being used. 
 
To be successful, risk management must address the behaviour - the biases, attitudes, and 
habits - of those making risk-related decisions. In particular, controlling psychological biases in the 
risk management process is important. If management ignores such biases, at best, the firm’s capital 
allocation will be far from optimal (i.e. will be poor and inefficient), which means losing 






The insurance industry, quite naturally, hinges on its skills and know-how to deal with risk 
and uncertainty. However this is proving to be increasingly difficult and complicated due to rapid 
globalization, technological development, and changes in nature (particularly in terms of climate 
change and crustal movement). 
 
 In order for firms to advance their risk management processes, the concept of ‘risk literacy’ 
should be broadened and include psychological biases against risk that ultimately lead to what I call 
‘judgemental risk’. Improving risk literacy in every organization is becoming increasingly critical. 
 
Secondly, we, as the industry, need to finance operations in a way that allows us to build-up 
a capital base that is much more resilient to significant stress scenarios. (Our financing needs to be 
dynamic.) 
 
• In practice, insurers need to set aside a capital buffer to cover losses arising from extreme 
events that may not necessarily be modelled or even foreseen. 
 
• Need to constantly look at our portfolio using a total balance sheet approach and assess how 
our assets and liabilities fluctuate under severe stress scenarios. →  How we prepare for 
tail-events is what defines us as insurers. (Our financing strategies need to be shaped on 
this premise.) 
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• Given that we are unable to foresee/predict the future, in order to make better and more 
rational decisions (around risk management and financing needs), we need to: 
– Draw on the lessons of the past (i.e. look to history for guidance) for better risk 
management 
– Build up and maintain stress-buffers for ‘uncertainties’ regarding tail events 
– Introduce built-in stabilizers as a counter-cyclical tool 
 
End 
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